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False Positives and Vulnerability Scanning on Cloud.gov

Explanation: Why False Positives Occur

Automated scanners may flag findings on Cloud.gov systems that aren't exploitable in practice.
This occurs because:

  • Automated tools can't evaluate compensating controls.
  • Cipher naming differences (IANA vs OpenSSL) create mismatches in reports.
  • Deprecated cipher modes may be partially supported for compatibility but mitigated by platform-level protections.

Cloud.gov provides this page to support system owners, ISSOs, and compliance teams when interpreting findings and documenting them in System Security Plans (SSPs).


Reference: Common False Positives

TLS Cipher Suites

Scanners may flag the following as “weak”:

TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x003C)
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xC027)
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xC028)
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x003D)
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009C)
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009D)

Disposition: False Positive.

  • Cloud.gov relies on AWS s2n-tls, which mitigates CBC padding oracle attacks (for example, LUCKY13).
  • Ciphers remain compliant with NIST SP 800-52r2, Appendix D.
  • TLS 1.3 is supported via AWS policies.

NIST 800-53 Control Mappings:

  • SC-8 (Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity): TLS enforces confidentiality/integrity for all transmitted data.
  • SC-12 (Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management): AWS manages validated key exchange and negotiation.
  • SC-13 (Cryptographic Protection): AWS FIPS-validated modules ensure cryptographic protection.
  • SC-20 (Secure Name/Address Resolution): TLS protections reinforce authenticity of endpoints.

BREACH (CVE-2013-3587)

Scanners may flag HTTP compression as a BREACH vulnerability.

Disposition: False Positive if application mitigations are in place.

  • BREACH mitigations include CSRF token masking, secret randomization, and length hiding.
  • Disabling HTTP compression isn't required and would degrade platform performance.
  • Modern web frameworks already include CSRF masking, which satisfies mitigations.

NIST 800-53 Control Mappings:

  • SC-23 (Session Authenticity): CSRF tokens protect session integrity.
  • SC-28 (Protection of Information at Rest): Ensures secrets are randomized or masked.
  • SC-34 (Non-Modifiable Executable Programs): Application frameworks enforce protections in code execution.
  • SI-10 (Information Input Validation): Randomization/masking of secrets prevents exploitable input conditions.

How-to Guide: Documenting False Positives in Your SSP

When documenting scanner findings:

  1. Identify the finding (cipher, BREACH, etc.).
  2. Reference Cloud.gov guidance (this page, SSP, or CIS/CRM mappings).
  3. Describe mitigation:
    • TLS mitigated via AWS FIPS-validated cryptographic modules.
    • BREACH mitigated via CSRF and application-level protections.
  4. Mark as False Positive in SSP/POA&M with citation.

Customer Responsibility

  • Ensure CSRF protections are implemented in applications.
  • Document compensating controls clearly in SSP narratives.

Tutorial: Example SSP Write-Ups

TLS Cipher Finding (SC-8, SC-12, SC-13, SC-20)

Finding: Scanner flagged TLSRSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as weak.
_Assessment:
AWS s2n-tls mitigates CBC attacks; cipher remains NIST SP 800-52r2 compliant.
Disposition: False positive, no remediation required.
Controls: SC-8, SC-12, SC-13, SC-20.

BREACH Finding (SC-23, SC-28, SC-34, SI-10)

Finding: Scanner flagged HTTP compression as vulnerable to BREACH (CVE-2013-3587).
Assessment: Application uses CSRF masking; BREACH mitigated at application level.
Disposition: False positive. No remediation required.
Controls: SC-23, SC-28, SC-34, SI-10.


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